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This paper provides a self-contained review of the introduction of the animal spirits 
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economic discussion of Pontryagin’s maximum principles. Thereafter, I develop a version of 
the increasing-returns Benhabib-Farmer model by showing the possible sub-optimality of the 
central planner solution and deriving the bifurcation condition for indeterminacy. Moreover, 
I give some insights on how to model intrinsic and extrinsic uncertainty. Finally, analysing 
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mechanism that in this model might lead prophecies to be self-fulfilling. 
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MARCO GUERRAZZI 
1. Introduction 
The importance of beliefs and expectations in economics – together with the possibility of an 
involuntary unemployment equilibrium – is probably one of the most important elements of the 
Keynesian legacy. After the publication of the General Theory (1936), the term ‘animal spirits’ 
used by Keynes as a synonymous for the entrepreneurial urge to action, has been also widely 
exploited to describe situations in which self-validating expectations or beliefs are the main sources 
of expansions and/or depressions.1
In spite of the old and ample evidence about the influence of subjective factors on economic 
outcomes, early writers – including Keynes – did not develop dynamic models in which realized 
outcomes were related to agents’ expectations.2 Only the rational expectations (RE) revolution of 
the 70s provided a straightforward way to endogenize beliefs. Specifically, macroeconomists of RE 
assumed that agents’ expectations were essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant 
economic theory (e.g. Muth 1961). 
Dynamic RE models were developed by using two distinct frameworks, i.e. the overlapping 
generations (OLG) model and the infinite horizon (IH) model. The former assumes that there is an 
infinite set of agents each of whom lives for a finite number of periods (usually two or three, e.g. 
Samuelson 1958). By contrast, the latter assumes a finite number of agents (usually one) that live 
forever (e.g. Koopmans 1965). In both kinds of framework, in spite of the respective distinctions, it 
is possible to show that if the RE equilibrium path is unique, then expectations must be univocally 
determined by technology, preferences and endowments. As a consequence, dynamic RE models 
with a unique equilibrium path do not allow for self-fulfilling prophecies. 
At the beginning of the 80s, relaxing the hypothesis of RE equilibrium path uniqueness, both 
OLG and IH models have also been used to develop the idea that animal spirits might exert 
independent influence on economic activity. However, taking into account the difficulties to 
synchronize the OLG framework with the average period of business cycles, IH models are now 
considered the favoured candidates to explain how ‘extrinsic uncertainty’, i.e. random phenomena 
that do not affect fundamentals sometimes referred as ‘sunspot activity’ (e.g. Woodford 1994), 
                                                 
1 However, Keynes (1936) did not use animal spirits to mean self-fulfilling beliefs; instead his view of uncertainty was 
closer to Knight’s (1921) concept of an event for which there is too little information to make a frequentist statement 
about probabilities. 
2 Azariadis (1981) recalls the Dutch ‘tulip mania’, the South Sea bubble in England and the collapse of the Mississippi 
Company as three well-documented cases of speculative price movements which historians consider unwarranted by 
‘objective’ conditions. More recently, it is worth reminding the bubble of dot-com financial assets and the bubble of US 
house prices (e.g. Shiller 2005). 
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might spark fluctuations in which prices or quantities change simply because are they expected to 
and price signals convey no structural information. 
This paper provides a self-contained review of the introduction of the animal spirits 
hypothesis into the IH optimal growth model by updating the ‘classical’ contributions by Dorfman 
(1969) and Shell (1969) that do not consider the issue of extrinsic uncertainty. My analysis begins 
with an economic discussion of Pontryagin’s maximum principles aimed at stressing the importance 
of the Hamiltonian function concavity and the role of the transversality conditions in defining the 
sufficient first-order conditions (FOCs) for a maximum problem in discrete and continuous time. 
Thereafter, I develop a version of the Benhabib-Farmer (1994) increasing returns model – which is 
a prime example inside the literature of IH models with self-fulfilling prophecies – by showing the 
problematic nature of the social planner solution and the optimality of the decentralized 
‘symmetric’ market-clearing equilibrium. To the best of my knowledge, formal proofs for those 
results are missing in the literature of indeterminacy. Moreover, after the derivation of the 
bifurcation condition for indeterminacy, I give some theoretical insights on how to model intrinsic 
(or fundamental) and extrinsic uncertainty. Finally, analyzing the spot equilibrium condition of the 
labour market, I provide an intuitive rationale for the mechanism that in this model economy might 
lead prophecies to be self-validating. 
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 derives some basic principles for the solution of 
maximum problems in discrete and continuous time. Section 3 develops a version of the Benhabib-
Farmer (1994) model. Section 4 provides a rationale for the mechanism that allows prophecies to be 
self-fulfilling. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Basic Principles on Optimal Control Problems 
In this section I provide a quick economic review of Pontryagin’s maximum principle that will be 
useful to solve the Benhabib-Farmer (1994) model (e.g. Pontryagin et al. 1962). Specifically, 
starting from the easiest discrete case, I derive the necessary – and sometimes sufficient – 
conditions for the solution of a maximum problem defined over a finite and an infinite horizon. 
2.1 Finite-Horizon 
Suppose to be interested in the solution of the following discrete-time finite-horizon maximum 
problem: 
                                                     { } ( ) 0                              ,1
1max
0, 01
>⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+∑==+ ρρ tt
T
t
t
xu
xuJ
T
ttt
                     (1) 
s.to 
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( )
0
,
0
1
>=
=−+
xx
xufxx tttt                                                              (2) 
Interpreting ρ  as a discount rate, i.e. the psychological cost of having something after one 
period instead of having it at once, the problem outlined above suggests that I’m interested in 
finding a sequence {  that maximizes the discounted sum of different realizations of the 
instantaneous objective function  subject to the dynamic constraints implied by (2). Thereafter, 
it immediately follows that the elements of 
}Tttt xu 01, =+
( )⋅J
{ }Tttt xu 01, =+  do not have the same degree of freedom. 
Specifically, while the vector  is free, within limits, to be chosen (control variables), the evolution 
of  (state variables) is determined by 
tu
tx ( )⋅f . 
The problem in (1) and (2) can be solved by writing a Lagrangian. Hence, 
                 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
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+λρ
λρλ
            (3) 
where λ  is a vector of Lagrange multipliers. 
Standard results on duality suggest that λ  can be interpreted as a system of implicit prices 
that defines the values of the marginal contribution to ( )⋅J  of a variation in x  (e.g. Mas-Colell et al. 
1995). 
Assuming that ( )⋅L  is concave, the sufficient FOCs for a maximum take the following form: 
                                           ( ) ( ) ( ) Tt
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                                         ( ) ( ) TtuxfxxL tttt
t
,...,0     ,0 **** 1* ==−⇔=∂
⋅∂
+λ                                            (6) 
where {  is optimal sequence that solves the dynamic problem in (1) and (2). }Tttt xu 0* 1*, =+
Now suppose to define the following auxiliary or Hamiltonian function: 
                                                      ( ) ( ) ( )tttttt xufuxJH ,, λ+≡⋅                                                         (7) 
In each period, the Hamiltonian is defined as the sum of the instantaneous objective function 
and the accrual of x  evaluated at its marginal worth. Therefore,  measures the total 
contribution of the activities going on at time , including both the direct contribution to the 
summation in (1) and the value of 
( )⋅tH
t
x  accrued in  (e.g. Dorfman 1969). t
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As far as (7) is taken into account, the FOCs in (4)-(6) can be re-arranged as follows: 
                                                          ( ) Tt
u
H
t
t ,...,0       0* ==∂
⋅∂                                                          (8)  
                                  ( ) ( ) Tt
x
H
t
t
t
tt ,...,0      
*
1*
*
1
* =−∂
⋅∂=−− −− ρλλλ                                              (9) 
                                     ( ) ( ) TtxufHxx tt
t
t
tt ,...,0      ,
**
*
**
1 ==∂
⋅∂=−+ λ                                        (10) 
The expressions in (8)-(10) are the core of the so-called ‘maximum principle’ and they are 
suited for a straightforward interpretation. First, (8) suggests to maximize the Hamiltonian with 
respect to control variables. Obviously, this can be done by differentiating  with respect to  
and equating the partial derivatives to zero at any time. As stated above, a necessary and sufficient 
condition for this procedure to detect a proper maximum requires the Hamiltonian concavity, i.e. 
the Hessian matrix of 
( )⋅tH tu
( )⋅tH  evaluated along the optimal sequence has to be semidefinite (or definite 
for strictly concavity) negative. Second, (9) states that along the optimal sequence, the decrease in 
the marginal value of a variation in x  is given by the marginal contribution of the control variables 
to the Hamiltonian net of the yield on the marginal value of the accrual in x . In other words, at any 
time, the marginal value of the accrual in the control variables flows into the marginal contribution 
of the control variables net of their psychological cost. Such a reading of the FOC on  in terms of 
an asset equation is provided by Dorfman (1969). Finally, (10) replicates the original set of 
difference equations for the state variables. 
tx
A special importance is attached to the FOC for the choice of the final value of x , i.e. . 
Its expression can be conveyed as 
1+Tx
                                              ( ) 0
1
10
1
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+⇔=∂
⋅∂
+
T
T
Tx
L λρ  or 0=Tλ                                             (11) 
The expression in (11) is known as ‘transversality condition’ and states that the actual value 
of the marginal evaluation of the control variables accrual at the end of the period has to be zero. 
This simple closing condition avoids the dynamic inefficiency of having some ‘left over’ value at 
the end of the period. Implicitly, being finite the time horizon, this means that there could be a post-
planning period to worry about (e.g. Shell 1969, 1971). 
The arguments put forward above suggest that in order to find the trajectory that solves the 
continuous-time finite-horizon maximum problem given by 
                                                                                    (12) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0        ,expmax
0
, 0
>−∫
=
ρρ dttxtuJt
T
txtu Tt
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                                                                            s.to 
                                                                 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) 00
,
0 >=
=
xx
txtuftx&
                                                           (13) 
 one has to follow the following steps. First, define the Hamiltonian: 
                                                          ( ) ( ) ( )xufxuJxuH ,,,, λλ +≡                                                 (14) 
Second, implement the continuous-counterpart of the FOCs in (8)-(10): 
                                                              ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0,, =∂
∂
u
ttutxH λ                                                        (15) 
                                         ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )t
x
ttutxHt ρλλλ −∂
∂=− .,&                                                (16) 
                                        ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( txtuft
ttutxHtx ,,, =∂
∂= λ )
λ&                                         (17) 
Finally, supplement the FOCs in (15)-(17) with the following transversality condition: 
                                                      ( ) ( ) 0exp =− TT λρ  or ( ) 0=Tλ                                                 (18) 
It is worth noting that the FOCs in (8)-(10) ((15)-(17)) can be re-arranged to derive a system 
of difference (differential) equations for control and state variables. In the continuous case, this can 
be easily done by differentiating (15) with respect to time and then using (16) to eliminate ( )tλ& . In 
the discrete case, the derivation of the difference equations for  is a simple re-statement of the so-
called Euler equation obtained by combining (4) and (5). Usually, there are infinite trajectories that 
satisfy this system of difference (differential) equations known as Pontryagin paths. Among this 
infinity, the trajectories that also satisfy the transversality condition in (11) ((18)) exactly define the 
solution of the maximum problem in (1) and (2) ((12) and (13)). Obviously, whenever there are 
many trajectories that fulfil those requirements, the problem admits multiple solutions. As it will be 
shown in section 3, multiple solutions might even exist whenever the dynamic system arising from 
the FOCs has a unique stationary solution. 
u
2.2 Infinite-Horizon 
Consider the discrete problem in (1) and (2) extended over an infinite horizon, i.e. +∞→T . The 
additional issues that might arise in an infinite-horizon problem concern the fact that the discounted 
sum of the realizations of  can be unbounded. In this case, no optimum exists. However, for a 
number of problems developed in the optimal growth literature, a maximum problem extended over 
an infinite horizon can be solved by applying the FOCs from the finite case supplemented by a 
different transversality condition. Let’s see how and why. 
( )⋅J
Suppose to define the following Lagrangian: 
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                                      ( ) ( ) ( )(( )ttttttt
t
t
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1
1
1
0
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⎛
+≡⋅ +
∞+
=
∑ λρ )
)
                                  (19) 
Let {  be a candidate sequence for the optimal solution. Thereafter, evaluate the first-
order Taylor expansion of  in the neighbourhood of 
}+∞=0ˆ,ˆ ttt xu
( tt xuL , ( )tt xuL ˆ,ˆ , where {  is an 
arbitrary sequence. Hence, 
}+∞=0, ttt xu
                                    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ttttuttxtttt xuuuLxxLxuLxuL ,ˆˆˆ,ˆ, Ψ+−+−+=                               (20) 
where ( )
{ } ∞+=∂
⋅∂=
0ˆ,ˆ ttt xu
x x
LL , ( )
{ } ∞+=∂
⋅∂=
0ˆ,ˆ ttt xu
u u
LL  while ( )⋅Ψ  is an error term. 
Consider the 3rd addend on the RHS of (20), i.e. ( )ttu uuL ˆ− . This term is given by 
                                              ( ) ( ) +∞=+∂
⋅∂⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+∑
∞+
=
,...,0      ˆ
1
1
0
tuu
u
H
tt
t
t
t
t ρ                                           (21) 
If (8) is assumed to hold from 0  to infinity, then the 2nd term in (21) is equal to zero for all 
. Therefore, t
                                                        ( ) +∞==− ,...,0       0ˆ tuuL ttu                                                   (22) 
Some difficulties might arise with the 2nd addend on the RHS of (20), i.e. . In the 
finite case, this term would be equal to 
( ttx xxL ˆ− )
                           ( ) ( ) ( ttT
T
ttt
t
t
tt
T
t
t
xxxx
x
H ˆ
1
1
1
1
11
1
0
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
⋅∂+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+ −−
−
=
∑ λρρλλλρ ) )                     (23) 
In the finite-horizon problem, (9) and (11) guarantee that the expression in (23) is equal to 
zero. Therefore, if  in (19) is concave, then the FOCs in (8)-(11) are sufficient for a maximum. 
However, in the infinite-horizon case, it is not enough to implement the transversality condition in 
(11), since  may be growing (or declining) too fast. 
( )⋅L
tx
For problems involving a positive discount rate, the transversality condition 
                                                                0
1
1lim =⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++∞→ tt
t
t
xλρ                                                         (24) 
 is necessary and sufficient (e.g. Weitzman 1973). 
The continuous-time counterpart of (24) is given by 
                                                            ( ) ( ) ( ) 0explim =−+∞→ txttt λρ                                                      (25) 
It is worth noting that (24) and (25) are not a simple extension, respectively, of (11) and (18) 
over an infinite-horizon. As suggested by Shell (1969), those transversality conditions express the 
desire of the maximizing agent to avoid ‘left over’ valuable assets (not only value). 
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Sometimes (24) and (25) have been interpreted as non-arbitrage conditions (no-Ponzi game 
conditions, e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004); indeed, those transversality conditions point out that 
the asymptotic actual value of the state variables has to be zero in the feasible manifold (e.g. Shell 
1969). Finally, the expressions in (24) and (25) suggest that explosive (or implosive) paths cannot 
be optimal. 
 
3. Benhabib-Farmer Model in Continuous Time 
The Benhabib-Farmer (2004) model investigates the properties of the one-sector IH growth model 
under the assumption of increasing returns to scale. The possibility of aggregate increasing returns 
is the guile that allows to break-down the path uniqueness of the RE equilibrium and is reconciled 
with the competitive behaviour of agents by using two distinct organizational structures, i.e. input 
externalities and monopolistic competition. On the one hand, the version with input externalities 
allows for the possibility that in a ‘symmetric equilibrium’ the social technology might display 
increasing returns to scale. On the other hand, the version with monopolistic competition proposes a 
framework similar to the models developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) in order to explore the 
relationship between market and optimal resource allocation in the presence of non-convexities. 
Since the dynamic implications of each organizational structure are qualitatively similar, 
here I develop a simple continuous version with input externalities by showing the possible sub-
optimality of a trajectory chosen by an omniscient social planner and the optimality of the 
‘symmetric’ decentralized market-clearing solution, i.e. a situation in which all the agents take the 
same actions and in all the markets demand equals supply. Moreover, after the derivation of the 
bifurcation condition for indeterminacy, I give some insights on how to model intrinsic (or 
fundamental) and extrinsic uncertainty. 
3.1 Building Blocks 
As in the standard one-sector growth model, the Benhabib-Farmer (1994) model assumes that an 
infinitely-lived representative agent is called in to choose consumption ( ) and employment (C L ) 
under the constraint implied by a capital ( K ) accumulation law. Whenever it does not harm the 
clarity of the exposition, in the remainder of the paper I will omit the functional dependence of the 
variables on time. Thereafter, following the notation introduced in section 2, the maximum problem 
to be solved can be conveyed as 
                                                                                   (26) { } ( ) ( ) 0                ,expmax
0
,, 0
>−∫+∞∞+
=
ρρ dtLCJt
tKLC
                                                                           s.to 
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( )
( ) 00
,,
0 >=
=
KK
KLCfK&
                                                             (27) 
The instantaneous objective function is assumed to take the following form: 
                                                   ( ) γγ ++−≡ 11
1log, LCLCJ          max0 LL ≤≤                              (28) 
where 1−≥γ  is a measure of the labour supply elasticity while  is the maximum amount of 
labour services that agents would be willing to supply. 
maxL
The expression in (28) deserves a short comment. First, as it will become apparent later on, 
Whenever separability between consumption and employment is combined with a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, the use of a logarithmic utility function over consumption is the only 
formulation of preferences consistent with a stationary labour supply in a growing economy. 
Second, the state variable K  does not enter directly the instantaneous objective function. 
The capital accumulation law for the overall economy takes the usual form. Hence, 
                                                         ( ) 10        ,, <<−−≡ δδKCYKLCf                                    (29) 
where δ  is the capital depreciation rate. 
The dependence of  on both control and state variables occurs through the production 
function; indeed, aggregate output 
( )⋅f
Y  is given by 
                                                                                                           (30) 1            ≥+= βαβα LAKY
where A  is a common-knowledge productivity shock, i.e. Solow’s (1957) residual, while the 
inequality on the RHS allows for the possibility of increasing returns to scale at the social level. In 
other words, (30) explains how aggregate output responds whenever all the agents simultaneously 
expand their use of inputs . 
I distinguish the individual problem from the aggregate problem by using an externality 
argument. Specifically, I assume that the individual technology  is given by a constant-returns-to-
scale Cobb-Douglas function. Hence, 
iY
                                                      ( ) 1                =+⋅= baLKY biaii φ                                                 (31) 
where ( ) ( ) ( ) ba LKA −−≡⋅ βαφ is a productivity parameter taken as given by the i -th agent and [ ]1,0∈i  
is an index for a continuum of identical agents. The terms with the upper bar represent, respectively, 
the aggregate stock of capital and the aggregate labour input.3 In other words, I assume that the 
                                                 
3 It is worth noting that whenever there prevails a symmetric equilibrium, i.e. whenever KKKi == and 
LLLi == , (31) reduces to (30). 
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productivity of an individual firm’s inputs is affected by an externality factor defined by the 
aggregate level of utilization of the same inputs. 
3.2 Centralized Solution 
Suppose that an omniscient social planner is called in to choose the optimal path for the model 
economy. This planner will try to maximize the discounted sum of the individual welfare in (28) by 
taking into account that the aggregate technology might be subject to increasing returns to scale. 
In order to solve the social problem, I define an Hamiltonian as I did in (14). Taking into 
account (28) and (29) it is possible to derive 
                                          ( ) ( KLCfLCKLCH ,,
1
1log,, 1 λγ
γ ++−≡
+ )                                       (33) 
where λ  can be interpreted as the social marginal value of a capital variation. 
Implementing (15)-(17), the FOCs for the social maximum problem become 
                                                                   0
1
=
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−
−
L
YL
C
λβ
λ
γ
                                                           (34) 
                                                            ( )λδρλαλ +−=−
K
Y&                                                         (35) 
                                                                                                                               (36) KCYK δ−−=&
In section 2 I stressed that the conditions in (34)-(36) are sufficient for a maximum if and 
only if  is concave.( )⋅H 4 Simple algebra suggests that this is the case whenever 
                                                                  01 ≤−− γβ                                                                    (37) 
The proof is given in Appendix. 
As long as aggregate technology displays increasing returns to scale, i.e. 1>+ βα , there is 
no certainty that (37) is verified. Specifically, this inequality may fail to hold in the case of 
increasing returns with respect to labour. Moreover, the more rigid the labour supply, the smaller 
the region in which  is concave. In the limit, if the labour supply is inelastic, i.e. ( )⋅H 1−→γ , and 
01 >−α , then there is no value of β  such that ( )⋅H  is concave. Therefore, even if stable, the 
social planner’s solution couldn’t be optimal; indeed, a divergent solution would always violate the 
‘centralized’ transversality condition, i.e. ( ) ( ) ( ) 0explim =−+∞→ tKttt λρ . Specifically, whenever (37) 
actually fails to hold, the social planner would be better off by pushing labour supply towards  
settling in a corner solution. 
maxL
                                                 
4 It is worth noting that in the optimal-growth model the marginal value of a capital variation flows into the marginal 
contribution of the state to the Hamiltonian net of its psychological cost plus depreciation. 
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3.3 Decentralized Solution 
A decentralized solution can be derived by re-formulating the maximum problem as follows. Let  
and  be, respectively, the labour supply and demand of the i -th representative agent. Moreover, 
let  and  be, respectively, its supply and demand for capital. The i -th agent sells  units of 
labour to the market and accumulates  units of capital that it rents out to other agents. 
Simultaneously, the -th agent demands  units of labour and rents  units of capital from 
others for the use in its own firm. As a consequence, in the decentralized solution, capital demand 
(supply) becomes a control (state) variable. 
S
iL
D
iL
S
iK
D
iK
S
iL
S
iK
i DiL
D
iK
Under these circumstances, the capital accumulation law for the i -th agent is given by 
      ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )DiSiDiSiSiibDiaDiDiSiSiDiD KKrLLwKCLKKKLLf −+−+−−⋅≡ δφ,,,            (38) 1=+ba
where  is its consumption,  is the real wage and iC w r  is the real rental rate.
5
Taking into account (28) and (38), the Hamiltonian for the decentralized problem is the 
following: 
                      ( ) ( ) ( )DiSiDiSiDiSiiDiSiDiSiD KKLLfLCKKLLH ,,,1 1log,,, 1 λγ γ ++−≡ +                         (39) 
where iλ  is the private marginal value of a capital variation. 
Implementing (15)-(17), the FOCs for the decentralized problem become 
                                                           ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0
1
1
1
=
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−⋅
−⋅
−
−
−
−
rLKa
wLKb
wL
C
i
bD
i
aD
i
i
bD
i
aD
i
i
S
i
i
i
λφ
λφ
λ
λ
γ
                                               (40) 
                                                             ( ) iii r λδρλλ +−=− &                                                            (41) 
                                         ( ) ( )DiSiDiSiSiiSiSi KKrLLwKCYK −+−+−−= δ&                                       (42) 
where . ( )( ) ( )bDiaDiSi LKY ⋅≡ φ
Moreover, the FOCs in (40)-(42) have to be supported by the following transversality 
condition: 
                                                          ( ) ( ) ( ) 0explim =−+∞→ tKtt Siit λρ                                                    (43) 
                                                 
5 In a market-clearing equilibrium  and , for all i . Di
S
i LL = DiSi KK =
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Simple algebra suggests that in a symmetric market-clearing equilibrium, i.e. whenever 
LLLL Di
S
i === and KKKK DiSi === , for all i , ( )⋅DH  is strictly concave.6 The proof is given in 
Appendix. Therefore, the symmetric decentralized solution described by (40)-(43) is optimal. 
However, taking into account the existence of the externality factor in (31), such a solution is not 
necessarily Pareto-efficient (e.g. Kehoe et al. 1992). 
3.4 Labour Market 
Now I show how the FOC in (40) entails the continuous spot equilibrium in the labour market. In 
this model economy, as it will be shown later on, the labour market equilibrium is the key to 
understand why prophecies might be self-fulfilling. 
Manipulating the elements in the first-three rows of (40) leads to 
                                                         ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1−⋅= bDiaDiSii LKbLC φγ                                                      (44) 
The LHS of (44) is the labour supply schedule of a single agent while the RHS is the 
corresponding labour demand. Taking the logs of each member it is possible to derive 
                                                ( ) ( ) DiDiSii lbakblc 1loglog −+++⋅=+ φγ                                          (45) 
where , ,  and . ii Cc log≡ DiDi Kk log≡ SiSi Ll log≡ DiDi Ll log≡
Obviously, the intersection of labour demand and supply provides the (log) equilibrium 
employment ( ) and the (log) equilibrium real wage ( ). See figure 1. Lˆlog wˆlog
 
 
Figure 1: Labour market at the individual level. 
                                                 
6 It is worth noting that in a decentralized symmetric equilibrium λλλ ==i , for all i . 
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Implementing the conditions for a symmetric market-clearing equilibrium, i.e. 
LLLL Di
S
i === and KKKK DiSi === , so that Ccci log≡= , for all i , it is possible to derive 
                                                   ( )lkAlc 1loglog −+++=+ βαβγ                                               (46) 
where  while Ll log≡ Kk log≡ . 
The LHS of (46) is the economy-wide labour supply while the RHS is the corresponding 
labour demand accounting for externalities. Recall that I assumed the possibility of increasing 
returns at the aggregate level, i.e. 1≥+ βα . Therefore, whenever 1>β , the aggregate demand for 
labour is upward sloped, a possibility theoretically stressed inter alia by Hall (1991). See figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Economy-wide labour market. 
 
Finally, it is worth remarking that for given values of  and , the equilibrium condition of 
the labour market provides the corresponding equilibrium level of 
c k
L . This suggests that I can only 
focus on one control. As a consequence, following the prevalent approach in the optimal growth 
literature, the remainder of the analysis is developed in terms of the (log) level of consumption. 
3.5 Local Dynamics under the Decentralized Solution 
In a symmetric market-clearing equilibrium, i.e. whenever LLLL Di
S
i ===  and 
KKKK Di
S
i === , for all i , the FOCs in (40)-(42) imply that 
                                                                 ( δρ +−=
K
Ya
C
C& )                                                           (47) 
                                                                  δ−−=
K
C
K
Y
K
K&                                                              (48) 
Let . As a consequence, (47) and (48) become Yy log≡
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                                                           ( ) ( )δρ +−−= kyac exp&                                                       (49) 
                                                        ( ) ( ) δ−−−−= kckyk expexp&                                                  (50) 
In order to derive an autonomous system of differential equations I have to express  as a 
function of  and . This becomes possible by combining the log-linearizations of (30) and an 
individual labour market-clearing equation. Hence, 
y
c k
                                                              lkAy βα ++= log                                                             (51) 
                                                              lyblc −+=+ logγ                                                            (52) 
Putting together (51) and (52), the subsequent expression follows: 
                                                            ckky 210 Φ+Φ+Φ=−                                                        (53) 
where ( )( )γβ
γβ
−−
++−≡Φ
1
log1log
0
Ab , ( )( )γβ
βαγ
−−
−−+≡Φ
1
11
1 and γβ
β
−−≡Φ 12 . 
It is worth noting that only  depends on productivity shocks. 0Φ
Using the result in (53), it also becomes possible to write down the pair of (autonomous) 
differential equations that define Pontryagin paths. Hence, 
                                                   ( ) ( )δρ +−Φ+Φ+Φ= ckac 210exp&                                              (54) 
                                                ( ) ( ) δ−−−Φ+Φ+Φ= kcckk expexp 210&                                         (55) 
Any trajectory  that solves (54) and (55) subject to the initial condition 
 and the transversality condition in (43) is an equilibrium path for the model 
economy; indeed, k  is pre-determined since 
( ) ( ){ +∞=0, ttctk }
( ) ( )0log0 Kk =
( )0k  is given by the initial conditions of the economy 
( ) while  is free to be determined by agents’ behaviour. 0k ( )0c
On the one hand, the unique steady-state solution of the dynamic system is the following: 
                                        
( )
( )
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
Φ+Φ
Φ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+Φ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +
Φ+Φ
Φ−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+Φ
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
21
02
21
01
*
*
1loglog
log1log
a
a
a
aa
a
k
c
δρδρ
δρδρ
                                 (56) 
On the other hand, the Taylor first-order approximation of (54) and (55) around (56) is given 
by 
                               
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−+++Φ−−−+Φ
+Φ+Φ
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
*
*
12
12
11
kk
cc
a
a
a
a
k
c δρδρδρδρ
δρδρ
&
&
               (57) 
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It is well-known that the trace ( ( )MTR ) of the  Jacobian matrix (2x2 M ) in (57) measures 
the sum of its two eigenvalues (  and ) while the determinant (1r 2r ( )MDET ) measures their product. 
Moreover, it is also well-known that when a linear transformation of the original variables is 
concerned, the eigenvalues of M  represent the slope of the phase diagram in the stationary solution 
( )** kc  (e.g. Gandolfo 1997). Taking those algebraic results into account, the expressions in (56) 
and (57) suggest that productivity shocks affect only ( )** kc  but not its local dynamics; indeed, 
 does not enter the Jacobian matrix 0Φ M . 
More detailed information about local dynamics can be found by analysing the expressions 
for )  and ) . Taking the definitions o 1(MTR MDET f(  Φ  an 2d Φ  into account, it is easy to show 
that 
                                                    ( ) ( )( )( )( )γβ
αγδρρ −−
−+++=
1
1TR
a
aM                                               (58) 
                                             ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( )γβ
αγδρδρ
−−
−+−++=
1
111DET
a
aM                                     (59) 
As a consequence of (59), it follows that 
                                                   ( )[ ] ⎥⎦⎢⎣ −− γβ 1
⎤⎡ −= α1SGNDETSGN M                                                (60) 
y without externalities,
                             
  On the one hand, in an econom  i.e. whenever 
                               1  and  1 <=<= ba βα                                                       (61) 
it holds that ( ) 0TR >= ρM and  ( )[ ] 0DETSGN <M . 
In this case 1r  and 2r  are of opposite sign so that the steady-state is a saddle point. This 
means that there is a one-dimensional manifold in the ( )kc,  space with the property that trajectories 
beginning on this manifold converge to the steady-state while all the others diverge. In other words, 
given ( )0k , there will be a unique ( )0c  in od  the neighbourho of the stationary solution that 
generates a trajectory converging to ( )** kc . This value of ( )0c  should be selected in order to 
satisfy the transversality condition in (43) and will place the system exactly on the stable branch of 
the saddle point ( )** kc . Therefore quilib at  in the neighbourhood of stationary 
solutio
, the RE e rium p h
n is unique or ‘determinate’. 
An economy in which the inequalities in (61) are verified is usually termed as a real 
business cycle (RBC) economy because fluctuations can be driven only by intrinsic uncertainty, i.e. 
shocks to fundamentals (e.g. Kydland and Prescott 1982). This result would be also obtained from a 
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central to scale, i.e.  planner solution in which the production function is subject to constant returns 
1=+ βα . 
On th d, whe other han enever externalities matter, i.e. whenever 
                                                              01  and  >−−> γβα a                                                     (62) 
it holds that ( ) 0TR <M  and ( )[ ] 0DETSGN >M . 
his means that there are two negative eigenvalues so that the stea state is a sink.T dy- 7 In 
other words, all the trajectories satisfying (54) and (55) which begin in the neighbourhood of 
( )** kc  converge back to the steady-state. As a consequence, given , there will be a 
continuum of equilibrium paths ( )
( )0k
( ){ }=0, ttctk  indexed by +∞ ( )0c , since any path converging to 
( )** kc  necessarily satisfies the transversality condition in (43). Completely stable steady-states 
giving 
cro evidence over the period 1929-1988. Empirical findings on 
increas
nom
rise to a continuum of equilibrium paths are termed ‘indeterminate’ because all the 
trajectories are optimal in spite of the unique stationary solution. 
The inequalities in (62) are known as the Benhabib-Farmer (1994) bifurcation condition for 
indeterminacy and they identify a so-called ‘animal spirits’ economy, i.e. an economy in which 
fundamentals are not able to pin down a unique RE equilibrium path. It is worth noting that the 
RHS of (62) is predisposed for a straightforward economic rationalization. Specifically, it simply 
states that – as in figure 2 – labour demand slopes up more than labour supply. Using a particular 
identification strategy, Farmer and Guo (1995) show that this unusual characterization of the labour 
marker can be consistent with US ma
ing returns to scale that go in the same direction are also found in Caballero and Lyons 
(1989) and Baxter and King (1991). 
Incidentally, the local dynamics analysis also allows to state two additional interesting 
results. First, taking the expressions in (53) into account, (61) and (62) suggest that productivity 
shocks are pro-cyclical in a RBC eco y without externalities and counter-cyclical in an ‘animal 
spirits’ economy. Second, suppose that the condition for the Hamiltonian concavity in the 
centralized problem is verified but 1>α . In this case, i.e. whenever there are increasing returns 
with respect to capital, taking the into account, both  and  would be positive so 
ansversality condition. 
                                                
result in (60) 1r  2r
that the steady-state would be an instable source whose explosive dynamics is inconsistent with the 
required tr
 
7 Whenever externalities matter it is not possible to rule out the possibility that  and  become complex. In this case, 1r 2r
ρ  and δ  can be used as bifurcation parameters that allow to detect limit cycles (e.g. Benhabib and Farmer 1994). 
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3.6 Modelling Intrinsic and Extrinsic Uncertainty: the RBC Economy versus the ‘Animal Spirits’ 
Economy 
In a RBC economy fluctuations are driven only by intrinsic (or fundamental) uncertainty. A simple 
 of uncertainty is the definition of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck pway to model this kind rocess for the log 
of the productivity shock.8 Hence, 
                                    ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) 0 and 0 ,0    log >≥>+−= AA ttAtA σθκχσθκ &&                      (63) 
where 
log
κ  is the rate of mean reversion, θ  is the long run mean of the process, Aσ  is the 
instantaneous standard deviation and ( )tχ  is a standard Brownian motion with zero drift and unit 
variance. 
Obviously, taking the results in (56) and (57) i to account, the actual realization of n ( )tA  will 
r the stationary solution of the model economy but it won’t calte hange its determ al 
dynamics. Without loss of generality, I assume that  is the negative (convergent) eigenvalues of  
ined loc
2r
M . As a consequence, the RE path of a RBC economy is described by 
                                 
( )
( )
( )( )
            ( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )( ⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Ω
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
kk
Ac
tk
tc
20
*
*
*
                     (64) 
where 
( )( )) ( )⎟⎟− −+⎟⎟ trtAk tAktktA t *0 exp                
( ) ( )
( ) ( )δρδρ
δρδρ
a
aar
−+++Φ
−−−+Φ−≡Ω
1
1
1
22
0  while ( )tA  follows the process in (63). 
By contrast, in an ‘animal spirits’ economy fundamentals cannot pin down a unique RE 
equilibrium path. This path multiplicity can be solved by modelling extrinsic uncertainty, i.e. by 
explicitly defining a process for the beliefs of agents that is independent of preferen
endowments and technology. As suggested by Farmer and Guo (1994), a simple way to model a 
belief function is to augment the differential equation for c  with any random variable 
ces, 
( )tV  
endowed with a zero conditional mean and finite variance. Moreover, in order to avoid the counter-
factual pro-cyclicality of negative productivity shocks, the level of ( )tA  is usually set to a constant 
value; indeed, Kamihigashi (1996) defines ‘animal spirits’ economies as economies with 
externalities and sunspots but without productivity shocks. As a consequence, the RE path of an 
 is described by 
                          )
‘animal spirits’ economy
( ) ( )( )
            ( 
( )
( )
( )
( )⎠
⎞⎛
⎦
⎤
⎣
⎡ −ΩΩ+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
tr
tr
k
ktktV
k
c
k
tc
2
1
*
0
*
*
*
p
exp
where 
⎟⎟⎜⎜⎝⎥⎢ −− kctct *
01
ex
                                 (65) 
( )
( )δρ
δρ
+Φ
+Φ−≡Ω
1
21
1
r , ( )[ ] 0=tVE , for all , while t 01 <r  and 02 <r . 
                                                 
8 Another conventional way to model intrinsic uncertainty is to define a stochastic process for a taste-shift in labour 
supply (e.g. Farmer and Guo 1994). 
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The actual realization of  is the guile that allows to solve the path multiplicity implied 
by the Benhabib-Farmer (1994) condition for indeterminacy in (62). In other words, among the 
infinite equilibrium paths, the realization of 
( )tV
( )tV  selects in an erratic way the trajectory actually 
followed by an ‘animal spirits’ economy. This procedure of randomization over a set of infinite 
equilibrium paths is also found in OLG models with indeterminate equilibria (e.g. Farmer and 
Woodford 1997). 
It is worth noting that this is a fairly rough-and-ready way to handle beliefs.9 Indeed, 
Kamihigashi (1996) argues the observational equivalence between a RBC and an ‘animal spirits’ 
economy. Specifically, Kamihigashi (1996) shows that given a realization of  (( )tA ( )tV ) it is 
always possible to define a process for ( )tV  ( ( )tA ) such that the optimal path for a RBC (‘animal 
spirits’) economy is an optimal path also for an ‘animal spirits’ (RBC) economy. Taking into 
account of this result, it is clearly impossible on a pure empirical ground to assess whether a 
particular trajectory comes from a RBC or an ‘animal spirits’ economy. Moreover, as suggested by 
Boldrin and Rustichini (1994), if indeterminacy is taken seriously, then the interpretation of many 
simple empirical contributions obtained by pooling together data from different countries can be 
seriously questioned. Specifically, in case of indeterminacy, there is no reason to believe that 
countries should be moving along the same equilibrium saddle path. 
 
4. Why are Prophecies Self-Fulfilling? A Discussion 
It might seem quite striking that the conditions for indeterminacy should lead to precise 
implications for the labour market outlook. However, thinking at the inherent logic underlying the 
standard IH optimal-growth model, the reasons of such a link are straightforward. A suggestive 
explanation has been suggested by Aiyagari (1995). 
Consider (45) and (46). The position of the labour demand schedule is fixed by the stock of 
capital. By contrast, the position of the labour supply schedule is fixed by the level of consumption. 
In the absence of shocks, a unique level of consumption determines a unique position for the labour 
supply schedule. This position, in turn, determines the unique equilibrium level of employment. 
Therefore, there will be a unique level of output and investment (from the resource constraint), 
which means a unique level of capital stock for the next period. See (29) and (38). From this 
argument, it is clear that the key to indeterminacy is that there can’t be a unique position of the 
labour supply schedule, which means that there can’t be a unique level of consumption. 
                                                 
9 More interesting possibilities are explored, for example, by Branch and Evans (2006) who model agents that forecast 
the future by means of a least square algorithm. 
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Along the lines put forward in the introduction, optimistic (pessimistic) expectations might 
lead agents to spend more (less) in consumption. Obviously, this will shift their labour supply 
schedules. In order to have an equilibrium path driven by self-fulfilling beliefs, these shifts have to 
lead to labour, output and investment outcomes that ratify the original optimistic (pessimistic) 
expectations. How this might happen? Presumably, current income and expectations on future 
income are what influence consumption most. In order for the agents to consume more (less) 
initially, they have to be optimistic (pessimistic) either that current and future labour incomes will 
be high (low) or that current and future interest rates will be low (high). In the labour market 
depicted in figure 1, optimistic (pessimistic) expectations, i.e. positive (negative) realizations of 
, lead agents to consume more (less) pushing the labour supply to shift inward (outward). 
Obviously, this lowers (raises) the current level of employment. Thus, current output and 
investment are lowered (raised). Thereby, future capital stock and, hence, future employment, 
output, and so on, are lowered (raised). Moreover, future interest rates are raised (lowered) since the 
capital stock is lowered (raised). These outcomes are clearly inconsistent with the original 
optimistic (pessimistic) expectations. 
( )tV
The arguments above suggest a way in which optimist (pessimistic) expectations can be self-
fulfilling. Consider the labour market in figure 2. In this case, optimistic (pessimistic) expectations 
will shift the labour supply inward (outward). This will raise (lower) employment and output. 
Raising (lowering) current output, optimistic (pessimistic) expectations can also raise (lower) the 
future capital stock and possibly lower (raise) interest rates. These effects are consistent with the 
higher (lower) initial consumption. Therefore, the original optimistic (pessimistic) expectations are 
self-validating. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks and Directions for Further Research 
This paper provided a self-contained review of the introduction of the animal spirits hypothesis into 
the IH optimal growth model by updating the ‘classical’ contributions by Dorfman (1969) and Shell 
(1969) that do not consider the issue of extrinsic uncertainty. The analysis begun with an economic 
discussion of Pontryagin’s maximum principle. Thereafter, I developed a version of the Benhabib-
Farmer (1994) model by showing the problematic nature of a trajectory chosen by an omniscient 
social planner and the optimality of the ‘symmetric’ decentralized market-clearing equilibrium path. 
Moreover, after the derivation of the bifurcation condition for indeterminacy, I provided some 
insights on how to model intrinsic (or fundamental) and extrinsic uncertainty. Finally, analysing the 
spot equilibrium condition of the labour market, I provided an intuitive rationale for the possibility 
of self-validating equilibrium paths. 
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The Benhabib-Farmer (1994) condition for indeterminacy has been widely criticized. On a 
pure empirical ground, Basu and Fernald (1997) argued that the degree of increasing returns 
required to generate an upward sloping labour demand seems to be implausible when compared to 
circumstantial evidence. The macroeconomists of self-fulfilling prophecies tried to address this 
criticism by developing multi-sector models in which indeterminacy arises with constant returns to 
scale and very small market imperfections (e.g. Benhabib and Nishimura 1998). However, there is 
another important theoretical shortcoming in models with indeterminate equilibrium paths, i.e. the 
assumption of continuous equilibrium in the labour market. In other words, there is no role for non-
voluntary unemployment in models that allow for self-fulfilling prophecies. Of course, there are 
some exceptions to this rule, each of them developed by exploiting the search approach to 
unemployment popularized by Pissarides (2000). Specifically, I refer to Burda and Weder (2002) 
and Giammarioli (2003). The former focuses on the complementarity between labour market 
institutions, the resulting equilibrium unemployment and the propagation of business cycles. The 
latter shows the possibility of an indeterminate equilibrium path whenever the social matching 
function displays a certain degree of increasing returns to scale with respect to vacancies. 
It is well-known that search unemployment falls in the category of ‘frictional’ 
unemployment; indeed, in the matching framework, the responsive for unemployment is the 
absence of a mechanism (say a market) in which the decisions of workers and firms are efficiently 
coordinated. With the exception of some attempts in this direction (e.g. Nakajima 2005 and 
Guerrazzi 2008), the task of building models with indeterminate equilibrium paths and involuntary 
unemployment is still in progress. 
 
 
 
A. Appendix 
In this appendix I discuss the conditions for the concavity of the Hamiltonian functions in the 
centralized and decentralized solution of the Benhabib-Farmer (1994) model developed in section 3. 
A.1 Hamiltonian Concavity in the Centralized Solution 
The FOC in (34) suggests that the Hessian matrix of ( )⋅H  is given by 
                                                        ( ) ⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−−−
−
−
2
1
2
110
01
L
Y
C
L
C
ββγ γ
                                            (A.1) 
The matrix in (A.1) ( ) is negative semidefinite (concave) whenever ( )⋅H
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                                                                      01 ≤−− γβ                                                              (A.2) 
A.2 Hamiltonian Concavity in the Decentralized Solution 
Considering the conditions for a symmetric market-clearing equilibrium, i.e. LLLL Di
S
i ===  and, 
KKKK Di
S
i === so that , for all i , the FOC in (40) suggests that the Hessian matrix of 
 is given by 
CCi =
( )⋅DH
                                     ( )
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(A.3) 
The matrix in (A.3) ( H ) is negative definite (strictly concave) whenever 
                                                  
( )⋅D
( ) 101332
222
=+⇔=−− baba
CLK
LKAabL βαγ                                     (A.4) 
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